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Renate Hornung-Draus*  
European Employer Organisations: Structure and Recent 
Developments** 
This paper draws a portrait of employer organisations at European level and their 
recent development in the context of the social dialogue, in particular the horizontal 
umbrella organisation of employers „UNICE“. The purpose is to give first hand descriptive 
information based on practical experience, rather than to elaborate abstract explanations 
based on theories of collective action. The first part contains a description of UNICE, its 
membership, purpose and role, its organisational structure and decision making 
procedures, as well as information about European sectoral organisations and the 
European Employers’ Network created by UNICE in 1993 to coordinate the views of 
sectoral and horizontal organisations in the field of social policy. The second part describes 
UNICE’s views on social policy and ist evolution along with the development of the social 
dialogue framework set by the Maastricht Treaty and consolidated by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The author concludes that the development of industrial relations at European 
level will depend – in any case as far as employers are concerned – fundamentally on the 
legal framework set at the European level. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit zeichnet ein Portrait der Arbeitgeberorganisationen auf 
europäischer Ebene und ihrer neueren Entwicklung im Kontext des europäischen sozialen 
Dialoges, mit besonderem Augenmerk auf dem horizontalen Dachverband der Arbeitgeber 
„UNICE“. Der Artikel verfolgt eher die Zielsetzung, auf praktischen Erfahrungen 
beruhende Informationen aus erster Hand zu geben, anstatt nach theoretischen 
Erklärungen für die Entwicklung und Verhaltensmuster dieser Organisationen zu suchen. 
Der erste Teil enthält eine Beschreibung von UNICE, ihrer Mitgliedschaft, Zielsetzung und 
Aufgaben, ihrer Organisationsstruktur und Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse, sowie 
Informationen über europäische Branchenverbände und das „European Employers’ 
Network“, das 1993 von UNICE gegründet wurde, um die Positionen der sektoralen und 
horizontalen Wirtschaftsorganisationen im Bereich der Sozialpolitik zu koordinieren. Der 
zweite Teil beschreibt die Positionen von UNICE im Bereich der Sozialpolitik und ihre 
Entwicklung im Zusammenhang mit der Schaffung eines gesetzlichen Rahmens für den 
sozialen Dialog durch den Maastrichter Vertrag und seine Konsolidierung durch den 
Vertrag von Amsterdam. Die Autorin kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Entwicklung der 
industriellen Beziehungen auf europäischer Ebene – jedenfalls soweit sie die 
Arbeitgeberseite betrifft – ganz wesentlich von den auf dieser Ebene festgelegten 
gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen abhängt. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
* Dipl.-Volksw. Renate Hornung-Draus, born 1959, Director of European and International 
Affairs, Confederation of German Employers Associations – Cologne (Bundesvereinigung 
der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, Gustav-Heinemann-Ufer 72, D-50968 Köln, Fax: ++49 
221 3795 299, e-mail: r.hornung-draus@bda-online.de, http://www.bda-online.de), Member 
of the European Social Dialogue Committee and of the Economic and Social. Committee of 
the EU, 1992-1994: Director of Social Affairs at UNICE – Brussels. 
** Artikel eingegangen: 12.9.97, revidierte Fassung akzeptiert: 26.2.98. 
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 Introduction 
Industrial relations at European level have developed against the background of 
very different national traditions concerning the balance between corporatist and 
individualist elements in the political systems, or more specifically, the notion of 
„social partnership“, the role of the State and the autonomy given to employers and 
trade unions in regulating the labour market, and finally, the types of organisations 
representing the interests of employers and workers. Nevertheless, it has been a 
common characteristic feature of (continental) European societies that private 
business has created an elaborate and highly representative system of organisations 
which represent its interests in the different political and social spheres, and which is 
the basis for the European level structure of interest representation. 
 National systems of representation of business interests 
Generally, there are two pillars of business representation in the continental 
tradition: on one hand, the chambers of industry and commerce, based in most cases 
on mandatory membership, on the other hand voluntary organisations. 
The chambers of industry and commerce have their main function at the local 
and regional level, where they promote business interests, provide services to 
affiliated companies on economic matters, administer examinations in vocational 
training and arbitrate disputes relating to competition between companies. In all 
European countries, except Austria, the chambers do not look after social policy, nor 
do they act as social partners or negotiate with the trade unions. In Austria, the only 
exception, collective bargaining is being dealt with both on the employers’ and on the 
workers’ side jointly by the voluntary organisations (Industriellenvereinigung resp. 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) and the mandatory structure (Wirt-
schaftskammern resp. Kammern für Arbeiter und Angestellte). 
The voluntary business organisations exist either as a single system in which 
economic, trade and social matters are covered by the same organisation – e.g. 
Conseil national du patronat Français (CNPF) in France, Fédération des 
entresprises belges (FEB) in Belgium, Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen – 
Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond (VNO-NCW) in the Netherlands etc – or 
as a dual system, in which economic and social matters are treated by different sets of 
organisations. This dual structure of voluntary business representation exists in 
Germany, where social matters are dealt with by the employers’ organisations 
organised by economic sectors, all of which are affiliated to the Bundesvereinigung 
der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA) and economic matters by trade 
organisations like the Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (BDI) representing 
manufacturing industry, the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (BdB) representing 
private banks etc. (with no horizontal confederation at the top), but it also exists in 
other countries, like Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Turkey etc. 
Historically, the tendency to establish a dual structure of voluntary business 
representation was motivated by two factors: Firstly, the existence of a strong and 
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united (horizontal) trade union movement like Landsorganisationen (LO) in Denmark 
at the turn of the century or the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) in post-war 
Germany required an equally strong and united horizontal employers’ organisation. 
Since business interests in labour and employment matters are more homogeneous 
across the different sectors of the economy than economic and trade matters, which 
very often imply a conflict of interests between sectors, the separation of economic 
and trade issues from labour and employment issues was a basis for constructing 
strong and united employers’ organisations on an interprofessional (horizontal) level. 
Secondly, the dual structure of organisations on the employers’ side enabled 
employers to draw a clear delimitation of the issues to be dealt with in the industrial 
relations framework, i.e. only labour and social affairs, while economic and trade 
matters were outside the scope of relations with the trade unions. 
In contrast to this situation, a single but sectorally fragmented structure of 
business representation often developed in countries, where the trade union 
movement had less bargaining power because it was less united and more politicised, 
consisting of politically oriented rivalling organisations, or where company level 
bargaining played an important role (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain). 
 The notion of „social partnership“ 
A further feature common to the (continental) European traditions of industrial 
relations is that the „social partners“, i.e. employers’ organisations and trade unions, 
are not perceived as pure lobbying organisations or pressure groups: they have a 
mission which goes beyond the representation of their specific interests and includes 
a responsibility for the public welfare. In accordance with this function they play an 
eminent role in the social security systems, labour market policy and the labour 
courts. In some traditions, e.g. Denmark, the State has left to the social partners the 
entire regulation of the labour market. The concept underlying this notion is, that – 
under the assumption of a balance of power between the two sides of industry – the 
active role of the employers’ organisations and trade unions in these fields leads to a 
better functioning of the labour market and social security systems as well as to an 
income distribution which is both economically sound and equitable, which in turn 
contributes to the competitiveness of the economy by keeping unemployment down, 
providing for an optimal allocation of resources on the labour market and minimising 
the number and negative impact of industrial disputes. 
These features – voluntary and highly representative employers’organisations 
and the notion of „social partnership“ – are the basis on which the European level of 
business representation in the social field has developed. 
 
 The structure of employer representation at European level 
The representation of employers’ interests at European level has developed in 
parallel with and as a response to European integration. A key factor in the 
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development of a truly European strategy for the representation of business interests 
has been the introduction and extension of qualified majority voting for European 
legislation. As long as decisions in Brussels were taken on the basis of unanimity, a 
purely national strategy of lobbying was sufficient in most cases, since every single 
government had the power to veto a decision in Council. With the introduction of 
qualified majority voting, this strategy was no longer efficient, because one, or even 
more governments could be overruled by the majority. It became necessary for 
employers to coordinate their positions and their lobbying at European level, so as to 
develop a truly European position with which they could convince at least the number 
of governments sufficient for constituting a potential blocking minority of their 
views. 
 The horizontal level: UNICE 
UNICE is the European confederation of central national business organisations. 
It was created in 1958 under the name of „Union des Industries de la Communauté 
Européenne“ (hence the acronym UNICE). In 1987 it changed its title to „Union des 
Confédérations de l’Industrie et des Employeurs d’Europe“ in order to reflect its 
identity more accurately: UNICE’s members include both industry and employers’ 
organisations from European countries which are members of the Council of Europe. 
 Membership 
As a general rule, central business organisations based on voluntary membership 
from all countries which belong to the Council of Europe can apply for membership 
in UNICE. The decision about the admission of new members is made by UNICE’s 
highest body, the Council of Presidents, on the basis of consensus. Since 1990, 
UNICE’s membership has undergone significant change. 
In 1990 UNICE had 32 member federations from 22 countries. The countries 
included the EC and EFTA member countries and furthermore Turkey, Malta, Cyprus 
and San Marino. The difference between the number of member countries and the 
number of member organisations indicates that the dual system of business 
representation, i.e. different central organisations for trade matters on one hand and 
employer matters on the other, existed in a significant number – nearly half – of 
countries: CH, D, DK, IRL, IS, P, S, SF, TR. The Dutch case was somewhat different 
in that the distinction between the two UNICE member federations VNO and NCW 
was based on religion (the NCW represented the Christian employers), while both 
organisations covered social as well as economic matters. 
Since 1990 two major changes took place with regard to UNICE’s membership: 
some western European member organisations merged, and new organisations from 
Central Europe joined UNICE as associate members with a special status. In 
December 1996 UNICE had 33 member organisations from 25 European countries.1 
                                                          
1  In July 1997 the following organisations were members of UNICE: 
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Mergers: Firstly, in some countries the two central organisations merged to 
become a single strucutre. This was the case in Ireland, where CII (Confederation of 
Irish Industry) and FIE (Federation of Irish Employers) became IBEC (Irish Business 
and Employers’ Confederation). In Finland the two UNICE member organisations, 
the Industrialists’ Association TKL and the Employers’ Organisation SDK also 
merged to become TT; however since TT represents only the manufacturing industry, 
the central Finnish organisation representing the service industry LTK, also joined 
UNICE in 1995. In Norway the economically oriented UNICE member organisation 
NHO merged with the Employers’ organisation NAF (which had not been a member 
of UNICE before) and the voluntary chambers of industry and crafts, the new central 
organisation being called CNBI – Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry. 
The Swedish members of UNICE, SAF and Industri-Förbundet also decided to merge 
in 1995, however this decision was cancelled again after a year of fruitless efforts to 
implement it. In 1995 the two Dutch UNICE members, VNO and NCW, which had 
been characterised by a substantial overlap both of member companies and of topics 
covered, merged and became „VNO-NCW“.  
The aborted merger of central industrial trade organisations and employer 
organisations in Sweden seems to confirm the continued validity of the hypothesis 
which had originally led to the development of dual structures of business 
representation at the central level, i.e. that in the context of strong trade unions and high 
collective bargaining responsibilities a single structure of representation may not 
always be the most efficient form of creating a countervailing power to the unions, due 
to inter-sectoral conflicts of interest on trade and economic matters. This is further 
supported by recent developments in Denmark, where the metal processing employers’ 
organisation – the most important member of the Confederation of Danish Employers 
(DA) – merged with the Danish Industry Federation (DI), thereby making DI implicitly 
a member of DA, without however merging the two central organisations. 
Central and Eastern Europe: With the fall of Soviet dominated communism the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe strove to set up liberal and democratic 
political institutions and market economy based on private property which included 
private entrepreneurship and the possibility for companies to set up free and 
voluntary business associations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 A: IV B: FEB/VBO CH: VORORT and ZVSAO 
 CZ: ZPCR CY: OEB D: BDA and BDI 
 DK: DA and DI E: CEOE F: CNPF 
 FIN: TT and LTK GB CBI GR: SEV 
 I: CONFINDUSTRIA IRL: IBEC IS: VSI and FII 
 L: FEDIL M: MFOI N: CNBI 
 NL: VON-NCW P: CIP and AIP PL: KPP 
 RSM: ANIS S: SAF and SI SK: AZZZ 
 TR: TISK and TÜSIAD 
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Contrary to the situation on the workers’ side – free and democratic trade unions 
existed partly even before the 1990 revolution, and where they existed, e.g. 
Solidarnosc in Poland, they were a key factor in bringing about the political changes 
of 1990 – the establishment of voluntary and truly representative „western style“ 
business organisations has been characterised by great difficulties. Doubtless, the 
main difficulty arose from the fact, that those sectors which were privatised first – 
commerce and services – are by nature less engaged in collective action, while the 
most important industrial sectors remained for a long time, and in many cases still 
remain, owned and/or controlled by the State. 
Nevertheless, sufficiently representative structures of voluntary business 
associations at the central level have emerged in the meantime in some of the CEECs. 
Some of these organisations have become associated members of UNICE with a 
special status, which includes inter alia the provision that membership is limited in 
time: after two years UNICE’s Council of Presidents must decide whether to renew 
membership of the organisations in question. To date the following organisations 
from CEECs are associate members of UNICE: KPP from Poland, ZPCR from the 
Czech Republic and AZZZ from the Slovak Republic. 
UNICE’s policy with regard to membership of business organisations from the 
CEECs is guided by three principles: Firstly the organisations must be eligible for 
membership (voluntary membership, broad representativeness of the business 
community, adherence to democratic principles, horizontal organisation at the central 
level), secondly, given that the development of business organisations in the CEECs 
is still very unsatisfactory and far from being consolidated, UNICE must not preempt 
or hinder national developments in these countries – therefore membership is limited 
to two years –, thirdly, since it is UNICE’s mission to „influence the European 
legislator“ membership in UNICE should include only those countries which have a 
direct interest in shaping the EU-policy through UNICE. 
Representativeness: Due to the different traditions of national business 
representation (cf. p. 292), the structure of UNICE’s member organisations is not 
identical and therefore UNICE’s representativeness of the different economic sectors 
is not even throughout the different countries. While it is true that all national 
member federations of UNICE are representative of companies of all sizes in 
manufacturing industry, some member federations do not represent the entire 
spectrum of service sectors. The extreme case is the Italian member Confindustria 
which includes services close to the manufacturing industry, but does not represent 
banks, insurances, trade or the crafts associations. In those countries, where there 
exists a dual structure of business representation (cf. p. 292f), the employer 
organisation competent for labour and employment affairs typically represents all the 
sectors, while the trade association often represents only a part of the service sectors. 
However, as far as small and medium sized companies are concerned, UNICE is 
highly representative of them, since the great majority of its member companies 
belong to this category. A survey undertaken by UNICE in 1992 shows that all 
member federations involved in the social dialogue today have SME-membership and 
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that craft industry is a member of the UNICE member federation in eight out of the 
15 countries involved (UNICE). 
UNICE’s representativeness has become the subject of controversy in the 
framework of the social dialogue, and more specifically with regard to the 
consultation and negotiation mechanism of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement 
(cf. p. 304f). Certain sectoral organisations representing for instance commerce 
(Eurocommerce) and crafts (UEAPME) claimed that the interests of these sectors 
were not sufficiently represented by UNICE and asked to participate in the horizontal 
Social Dialogue together with UNICE. 
UEAPME has instituted proceedings against the framework agreement on 
parental leave in September 1996. The European Court of Justice (Tribunal of First 
Instance) has received the suit and is expected to pronounce its verdict in summer 
1998. UEAPME’s suit is based on two claims: a) that organisations representing 
SMEs have been excluded from the negotiation procedure and b) that the agreement 
does not take adequate account of the interests of SMEs. In UNICE’s opinion both 
assertions are unfounded: First of all, as shown above UNICE, is highly 
representative of SMEs – in fact, the most important member organisations of 
UEAPME are also members of UNICEs national member organisations. Secondly, 
the parental leave agreement contains specific clauses in favour of SMEs, taking 
account of their specific situation in giving the employer the right to postpone the 
employee’s wish for parental leave, if his absence would provoke organisational 
problems for the company. These clauses favour employers more than existing 
legislation e.g. in Germany. 
While UNICE has always pleaded in favour of extensive consultations of all 
interested organisations by the European Commission and encouraged autonomous 
sectoral social dialogue on sectoral matters, it has refused to include European 
sectoral organisations as independent actors on the employers’ side of the 
autonomous horizontal social dialogue which consists of negotiating joint opinions or 
agreements on interprofessional matters with the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC). UNICE has taken this position on the grounds that it is by far 
the most representative horizontal employers’ organisation at European level and 
covers, in fact, many of the national branch organisations, which Eurocommerce and 
UEAPME claim to represent. Furthermore, adding more actors to the employers’ side 
– which consists already of two organisations: UNICE for private employers and 
CEEP for public employers -, which will have to negotiate with a single and united 
ETUC, would substantially weaken the employers’ negotiating position. As 
mentioned before, UNICE’s representational gaps in certain service sectors concern 
only some countries and should therefore be closed in a pragmatic way by 
coordinating the employers’ side at national level in the countries concerned. 
However, when it comes to negotiating horizontal matters, which are of particular 
importance for certain sectors, UNICE is quite willing to invite experts from the 
sectors concerned to assist the employers’ negotiating team. This has been the case 
for the negotiations on part-time work: since part-time work is of particular 
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importance for commerce, hotels and restaurants and the industrial cleaning sectors, 
UNICE has invited experts from these three European branch organisations to assist 
the UNICE negotiating team. 
UNICE’s position has been based on the Commission’s communication 
concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy (European Commission 
1993), which clearly states that it consults a broad range of representative EU-level 
organisations, but that it respects the autonomy of the social partners when it comes 
to negotiations on the grounds of mutual recognition (para 31). The Commission 
intends to maintain this position in its second Communication on the Social Dialogue 
at European level, which is in the process of drafting at the time being. 
The study on the representativeness of European level employers’ organisations 
and trade unions published by the European Commission in 1993 together with the 
above mentioned Communication shows however, that UNICE is by far the most 
representative horizontal European level employers’ organisation (European 
Commission 1993). 
It is probably true to say, that a certain amount of incoherence concerning 
UNICE’s representativeness of service sectors is the expression of the pluralism of 
national traditions in Europe which cannot disappear completely as long as these 
traditions continue to exist at national level. Therefore the notion of 
representativenenss cannot be defined in the European context with the same degree 
of stringency as at national level. Nevertheless, a tendency towards more coherence at 
European level is emerging in the context of the European employers’ network which 
was created by UNICE in order to coordinate the views of all European level business 
organisations in the field of social policy (cf. p. 302). 
 UNICE’s Purpose and Role 
UNICE’s purpose is to defend the interests of business vis-à-vis the European 
legislator. This means that UNICE is the spokesbody for European business on all 
horizontal matters which are subject to European level legislation and/or policy. 
UNICE does not deal with sector-specific issues – these are covered by the European 
sectoral business associations (see below).  
UNICE’s main interlocutor is the European Commission. Furthermore, UNICE 
has to lobby the European Parliament, the powers of which have greatly increased 
since the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, and the Economic and 
Social Committee, which has no power to amend or block legislation, but emits 
comments and opinions which are taken very seriously by the European Parliament 
and the other European Institutions. Once a draft proposal has been adopted by the 
Commission, lobbying of the Council of Ministers is done jointly by UNICE and its 
national member federations, who are in direct contact with their respective 
government representatives. 
UNICE has always been a strong supporter of European integration, and 
consequently one of its main tasks has been to promote the completion of the single 
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market. In doing so, UNICE’s lobbying activities were directed at ensuring that 
European legislation  
 was in line with the principles of the market economy and of an open 
multilateral trading system (no „Fortress Europe“) 
 was practicable, so that it could be implemented by companies 
 avoided additional costs or bureaucracy for companies 
 contributed to the competitiveness of European companies by eliminating 
national barriers. 
Unlike some European business clubs, e.g. the European Round Table, a group 
composed of the chairmen of the largest European multinationals, who can select a 
very limited agenda of key topics for their activities, UNICE has to cover the whole 
range of European policy which is of relevance to companies from more than one 
sector. The issues covered by UNICE include economic and financial affairs, external 
relations, company affairs, industrial policy,and last not least, social affairs. The 
priorities of UNICE’s activities moved along with the European policy agenda: 
European social policy, for instance, which had played only a minor role for UNICE 
in the first decades of its existence, has become one of its most important fields of 
action since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the Maastricht Social 
Policy agreement (see below). 
However, UNICE has not only followed the European policy agenda, it has laso 
been able to influence European policymaking in a proactive way: UNICE’s studies 
on competitiveness and on deregulation have paved the way for important European 
initiatives like the creation of the high-level group on competitiveness, which reports 
to the President of the European Commission twice yearly and the 1995 „Molitor 
report“ on deregulation. 
 Organisation and decision making 
The task of defending the interests of business at the European level is a very 
complex one: first of all, UNICE has to find out about legislative projects within the 
Commission, which are of relevance to business. It has to inform member federations 
about these possible projects and coordinate the process of establishing the European 
employers’ position on every single issue. This position will then be made known to 
the European policy makers – either in consultations organised by the European 
Commission or European Parliament or in individual contacts and at other occasions. 
The flow of information between UNICE and its member federations and the 
decision making processes are channelled through UNICE’s governing bodies: 
The Council of Presidents is composed of the Presidents of UNICE’s member 
organisations and chaired by the President of UNICE. It meets at least twice a year 
and is the highest ranking decision-making body of UNICE, deciding on matters of 
vital concern, e.g. the election of the UNICE President, the admission of new 
members, UNICE’s statutes. 
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After the entry into force of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement the Council 
decided, that it should be the body responsible for deciding about the entry into 
negotiations, the adoption of the negotiating mandate, and the conclusion of 
negotiatons. Decisions on this matter are taken on the basis of consensus of all the 
federations concerned, i.e. to date all EU and EEA member federations except the 
United Kingdom. 
The Executive Committee consists of the federations’ Directors General and is 
also chaired by the President of UNICE. It meets at least three times per year and 
decides about major policy matters, i.e. position papers submitted by the main policy 
committees, the management of the association and the budget. It also prepares all the 
decisions to be taken by the Council of Presidents. 
The Executive Committee has two sub-committees, which prepare its decisions: 
 the Finance Committee meeting at least twice a year and preparing the budget 
 the Committee of Permanent Delegates which is composed of the Brussels 
representatives of UNICE’s member federations. This committee meets every 
two weeks and is the most important link between the secretariat of UNICE and 
the member ferderations. 
Five Main Policy Committes composed of the competent representatives of the 
national member federations have been set up to develop UNICE’s positions on 
 Economic and Financial Affairs 
 Social Affairs (labour law, labour market policy, health and safety, social 
security, education and training, social fund) 
 Company Affairs (company law, technical harmonisation etc) 
 Industrial Affairs (energy, environment, small and medium sized companies etc) 
 External relations. 
The main policy committees are assisted by technical working groups, who 
follow the concrete projects in detail and prepare the position papers. 
Decision making procedures: On policy positions UNICE’s statutes require a 
qualified majority: a proposal is adopted unless a minimum of three countries voting 
together oppose it. In the event of a federation being overruled by the majority, it has 
the right to make its minority position known in a footnote to the position adopted. In 
reality it hardly ever happens that federations are being overruled – in most cases a 
compromise position which is acceptable to all federations can be found. For internal 
budgetary matters, votes are weighted with each country’s share in the UNICE 
budget, the blocking minority being at votes representing 20% of the budget. 
However, the procedure governing the Council of Presidents’ decisions on 
negotiations in the framework of the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement is more 
severe than the procedures applied to the other policy matters: on these matters 
UNICE’s statutes require a consensus (not unanimity) of all federations concerned. 
This means, that one federation can block a decision in this framework. 
Secretariat: Compared to the amount of work and topics covered, the secretariat 
of UNICE is extremely small – it operates in Brussels. with a permanent staff of some 
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33 to 35 employees directed by the Secretary General. This is only a fraction of the 
staff employed by its counterpart on the workers’ side, the ETUC or by certain 
sectoral business federations at European level. 
 The sectoral level: the „FEBI“ and the European Employers’ Network 
 The „FEBI“ 
Since the beginnings of the European Community a multitude of sector-specific 
business organisations were created at the European level. They are often referred to 
as „FEBI“, from the French expression „Fédérations européennes par branche 
d’industrie“. Their task has been to defend the companies’ interests in the different 
stages of the creation of the single market: The common agricultural policy has led to 
the creation of an extremely powerful organisation representing agriculture – COPA, 
and a large number of organisations representing agricultural sub-sectors, e.g. sugar, 
meat, cereals, etc.. Technical harmonisation has been the main purpose for the 
creation of sectoral associations in manufacturing industry, e.g. CEFIC for the 
chemical industry, Orgalime for machine tool makers, the European association of 
automobile producers, FIEC for the construction sector, etc. Finally, Delors’ Single 
market project of 1987 which contained a large number of Community initiatives 
aiming at completing the creation of the Single market and implementing the four 
freedoms was accompanied by the rapid development and proliferation of European 
level associations representing the different service sectors, the most important of 
which are undoubtedly the organisations representing banks (EBF, EABC and 
ESGB), the insurances (CEA) and commerce (Eurocommerce).  
While the original purpose of the FEBI was directed at purely economic matters 
subject to European legislation, the social dimension of the Single market included in 
the Single European Act of 1987, and especially the development of the social 
dialogue between employers and trade unions at European level, led to an increasing 
involvement of FEBI in social policy issues. This development was triggered off by 
the sectoral committees of the European trade union movement which wanted to set 
up sectoral social dialogues as a preliminary form of European level collective 
bargaining and was strongly supported by the European Commission and its 
President Jacques Delors, who devoted large amounts of financial resources and of 
personnel (DG V created a whole department for the sectoral social dialogue) to the 
promotion of the sectoral social dialogue (cf. European Commission 1995). 
 The European Employers’ Network 
The involvement of the FEBI in European social policy, most of which was of a 
horizontal nature, involved the risk of duplication, or worse, of fragmentation and 
incoherence of the employers’ positions at European level, despite the fact, that the 
national member organisations of the FEBI are in general the sectoral members of 
UNICE’s member organisations. This risk became even more acute with the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the Social Policy Agreement, which 
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strengthened the role of employers and trade unions at European level by providing 
for regular consultations and the possibility to negotiate the content of European 
social measures between employers and trade unions (cf. p......). 
In order to coordinate and give a certain coherence to European social policy on 
the employers’ side, UNICE created the „European Employers’ Network“ (EEN) in 
1993. The EEN is an informal structure open to all sectoral employers’ organisations at 
European level which are interested in European social policy. Its objectives are to 
provide a forum for the exchange of views and informations on social policy between 
European employer organisations, to promote convergence of views and positions 
among employers in order to enhance their ability to make strong and credible 
representations to the Community Institutions and European Trade Unions, and to 
prevent proliferation or duplication of overlapping agreements at European level. 
The EEN functions on the basis of voluntary membership and mutual confidence 
on the understanding that every federation retains its full autonomy and the right to 
make its own final decisions. It has been very successful in coordinating the 
employers’ views so far: 57 European organisations including all the major sectors 
have joined it to date. The only organisation which had refused to join the EEN until 
very recently is UEAPME, an organisation representing crafts associations at 
European level, although it must be said that some of the most important members of 
UEAPME e.g. the German crafts association, are represented in UNICE through their 
national central organisations. 
The integration of the European sectoral organisations in UNICE differs from 
the way in which the ETUC has handled this problem: there, the European sectoral 
committees have become members of ETUC alongside the national trade union 
confederations, which are the prime members of ETUC. This type of solution has not 
been favoured by the majority of UNICE’s member federations, who argue that the 
integration of sectoral interests takes place at national level within UNICE’s member 
federations, which are themselves composed of the same national sectoral 
organisations which form the FEBI at European level. A double membership of the 
sectors at national and at European level, would complicate the organisational 
structure and confuse the decision making procedures. However, this topic will 
certainly be rediscussed within UNICE against the background of increasingly scarce 
resources of the national central organisations and the conflicting need to increase the 
employers’ commitment at European level. 
 Social policy and European industrial relations from the employers’ point 
of view 
The starting point for UNICE’s considerations about European social policy and 
industrial relations is the recognition that Europe does not constitute a social tabula 
rasa, on which any desired policy can be imposed, but that they have to build upon and 
be compatible with the great variety and heterogeneity of existing national traditions 
(cf. R. Hornung-Draus, 1994). Furthermore, the notion of European industrial relations 
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should not be focused too narrowly on collective bargaining, but it should take into 
account the complexity of relations between the social partners at European level and, 
indeed, between the social partners and the European Institutions. 
 European social legislation 
UNICE has consistently held the view that Europe’s political and economic 
integration does not presuppose a harmonisation of national social policies, indeed 
such a harmonisation would be impossible to achieve, bearing in mind the deeply 
rooted fundamental differences between national traditions. Therefore UNICE has 
argued that European level legislation in social policy is legitimate and necessary 
only in the following areas: 
 The elimination of any obstacles to the free movement of persons in the Single 
market, especially through the coordination of social security systems; most of 
this work has been achieved in the 1960s and 1970s – e.g. Regulation 71/1408. 
 The establishment of European minimum standards on the protection of health 
and safety at the work place, in order to avoid that competition in the Single 
market takes place at the expense of workers’ health. In this field a large number 
of directives have been adopted on the basis of Article 118a EC-Treaty (which 
was inserted in the Treaty by the Single European Act in 1987). 
 UNICE’s criticism of many European proposals based on Art. 118a has been 
twofold: Firstly, in many cases the provisions included in the directives were not 
minimum, but rather unnecessarily high maximum standards, the 
implementation of which involved heavy costs for companies. The result of 
these unrealistic „minimum“ standards has been that the enforcement of these 
standards turned out very unequal throughout the EU. The employers would 
have preferred less ambitious standards, but where even enforcement throughout 
the EU would have been guaranteed. Secondly, UNICE criticised the excessive 
interpretation of Article 118a by the European Commission, which recurred to it 
as a legal basis even for proposals going far beyond the protection of workers’ 
health and safety, e.g. in the working time directive which was adopted by 
Council in 1993.  
 The Val Duchesse Social Dialogue 
In addition to legislation, the social dimension of Europe also includes 
consultation practices between the European Commission and the social partners as 
well as voluntary contacts and exchanges of experiences between the social partners 
at European level. They were first formalised with the Social Dialogue between 
UNICE, CEEP (the public employers’ organisation) and ETUC, which was 
inaugurated at the Val Duchesse summit meeting (named after the place in which the 
event took place in Brussels) convened by Commission President Jacques Delors in 
1985. It consists of two elements: on the one hand the Commission undertook to hold 
regular consultations with the three organisations prior to the adoption of leislative 
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proposals in the social field, on the other hand, the Commission gave financial and 
logistic support to the European social partners for creating joint working groups 
which discussed certain topics of particular relevance to them and developed „joint 
opinions“. These joint opinions included subjects such as information and 
consultation of employees in the context of the introduction of new technology, pay 
moderation to promote economic growth and employment, access to further training, 
lifelong learning and the adaptability of the labour market (cf.: Hornung-Draus 1994, 
European Commission 1995). 
The Val Duchesse Social Dialogue has sometimes been criticized as being too 
general and failing to lead to any binding agreements between the social partners. 
However, this criticism overlooks the most important effect of the joint opinions, 
which was that the respective working parties provided – for the first time – a truly 
European platform for the exchange of experiences between representatives of 
national social partners. The working groups of the social dialogue offered the 
national social partners the opportunity to widen their horizon beyond their national 
system, to develop an understanding of other systems and traditions and to arrive at 
European common positions which were compatible with the different national 
approaches. In achieving this mutual understanding, the Val Duchesse Social 
Dialogue is a necessary element in the development of European level industrial 
relations. UNICE therefore advocates the continuation of this „traditional“ social 
dialogue in parallel with the new consultation and negotiation procedures introduced 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. 
 The Maastricht Social Dialogue 
The Maastricht Agreement on Social policy strengthened the role of the social 
partners at European level considerably. The consultation and negotiation procedure 
introduced by this Agreement was elaborated by UNICE/CEEP and ETUC within the 
framework of the Social Dialogue and submitted to the Intergovernmental 
Conference in 1991. 
UNICE was opposed to a further extension of European legislative competence 
in the field of social policy. However, once it became clear in the course of the 
Intergovernmental Conference that governments were heading for an extension of the 
EC’s social powers, which went so far that it covered even areas which in some 
countries belong to the sphere of autonomous regulation by the social partners – e.g. 
„working conditions“, UNICE considered it vital to improve the possibilities for the 
social partners to participate in the legislative process in the social field. 
The procedural proposal submitted to the Intergonvernmental Conference by 
UNICE/CEEP and ETUC was included in the draft social chapter, which was to 
replace the existing social chapter of the EC-Treaty (Art.117 following). However, 
due to the UK’s persistent objections against the new social chapter, the other Heads 
of State decided to leave the social chapter of the EC-Treaty unchanged and to 
incorporate the new draft social chapter into the Maastricht EU – Treaty as an annex 
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to the Social Policy Protocol, which stipulates that the eleven member States (all 
member States except the UK) could use the EC-Institutions in order to adopt social 
policy on the basis of the Agreement. 
The Maastricht Social Policy Agreement contains three key provisions 
concerning the social partners’ role in shaping European social policy: 
Consultation: the double consultations practiced by the Commission on a 
voluntary basis in the framework of the Val Duchesse Social dialogue were now 
introduced into the Agreement as an obligation for the Commission (Article 3 of the 
Agreement). 
Negotiation: Following the second consultation, the social partners may decide 
to negotiate the content of the Commission’s proposal, thereby obliging the 
Commission to suspend the normal legislative process for the duration of the 
negotiations (maximum 9 months, with a possibility for extension by a joint decision 
of the social partners and the Commission) 
An agreement adopted by the European social partners on this basis can be 
implemented either by submitting it via the Commission to Council, which will then 
adopt it as a legally binding instrument (in most cases a directive) – or reject it, or it 
can be implemented via the voluntary route of the social partners’ organisations. In 
concrete terms this would mean that the signatories to the agreement – the European 
social partners – would recommend that their national member organisations 
implement it: Unlike „real“ collective agreements at national level which are binding 
both for the signatories and their member organisations/companies, the 
implementation of European agreements concluded in this framework cannot be 
enforced with regard to the national member organisations or companies. 
Transposition: The Maastricht Social Policy Agreement finally stipulates that 
European social policy directives – irrespective of whether they were adopted in the 
traditional legislative procedure or by an agreement of the European social partners 
and then submitted to Council – may be transposed into national provisions not only 
by the legislator, but under certain conditions also via an agreement of the social 
partners at national level. This option, known as the „Christophersen-clause“ (named 
after the Danish Commissioner who introduced it for the first time in the working time 
directive) is particularly important for those countries, in which the issues dealt with in 
the European directives are covered by the social partners at national level. This clause 
has already been applied in certain countries for the transposition of the working time 
directive (DK), and the transposition of the European works council directive (B,I,N). 
With the Maastricht Social policy Agreement European industrial relations have 
entered a completely new stage: for the first time in the history of European 
integration, the role of employers’ and workers’ organisations as „social partners“ 
with responsibilities going beyond mere lobbying, has been formalised at European 
level. One of the great achievements of this Agreement is that it has provided a 
formal basis for the development of European level industrial relations which is 
compatible with the different national systems of industrial relations. Considering the 
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novelty of the procedure, it is quite encouraging to see that the negotiating procedure 
has already been used successfully by UNICE/CEEP and ETUC to substitute a 
Commission draft directive on parental leave by an agreement at European level. A 
second framework agreement about working conditions for part-time work replacing 
the Commission’s draft proposal on this issue has been concluded in 1997 and 
adopted by Council on 15 December 1997. In 1998 the negotiating activity may well 
gain momentum: UNICE has offered to ETUC to negotiate on working conditions for 
fixed term work, in order to replace a Commission initiative in this field. ETUC has 
accepted these negotiations despite the fact that UNICE has not offered to negotiate on 
information and consultation of workers in a national framework. A very large majority 
of UNICE’s member federations are in favour of such negotiations, but the consensus 
which is necessary for such a decision has not been reached, mainly because some 
federations believe that the UK Labour government which holds the EU Presidency at 
the moment may be able to convince the Commission to withdraw its initiative on this 
subject matter or organise a blocking minority in Council. 
However, in UNICE’s view – which differs in this point from ETUC’s 
interpretation – the negotiations in the framework of the Agreement are primarily a tool 
in the process of shaping European social legislation. They are different in nature from 
the classical national or sectoral collective bargaining and therefore they are not meant 
to constitute the beginning of European level traditional collective bargaining. 
 The future development of European industrial relations 
The situation today is characterised by the existence of relatively strong, 
representative and well established European social partner organisations at the 
horizontal level who have at their disposal the Maastricht Social Policy Agreement, 
which has become an integral part of the EC-Treaty with the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1997 – a new platform for exercising influence and actively shaping European social 
policy, which is compatible with the different national traditions of industrial relations. 
However, as far as the development of collective bargaining is concerned, 
Europe is currently experiencing several contradictory trends, which make it difficult 
to foresee, in which direction industrial relations will move at European level: On one 
hand there is a trend of convergence towards less ideological and politicised and 
more cooperative styles of industrial relations. This trend is particularly visible in 
countries like Italy, Portugal, Ireland or partly in France where national agreements 
on pay moderation, working time and other working conditions were concluded 
recently. On the other hand, some countries, which have a particularly strong 
tradition of centralised, or regional multi-company collective bargaining are 
undergoing a period of failures to reach agreements, which are accompanied by State 
interventionism as in the case of Belgium, or of companies questioning the usefulness 
of such arrangements and asking for a greater decentralisation of industrial relations: 
e.g. the Swedish employers pulled out of central bargaining altogether and 
concentrate on the regional and sectoral level, many companies in the German metal 
processing industry – the most important sector of the German economy – have 
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criticised the „Flächentarifvertrag“ in their sector as being too rigid for the needs of 
individual companies. It seems today that the reforms of this instrument towards 
more flexibility and options for individual companies as well as findings of 
comparative research, which underline the positive economic performance of multi-
employer bargaining (Traxler 1997) have resulted in a more positive appraisal by 
those who had questioned its principle. 
It is argued sometimes that the European works council directive provides the 
basis for the first „real“ collective bargaining to emerge at European level, which will 
take place at company level in the multinational companies. This hypothesis does not 
hold true on the basis of the experiences made so far. In fact, the directive does oblige 
companies to negotiate with a „special negotiating body“ representing the workers’ 
side about the establishment of a procedure for information and consultation on 
transnational issues. Negotiation ends however as soon as such a procedure has been 
established, either on the basis of a negotiated agreement, or in the event of no 
agreement being reached on the basis of the subsidiary requirements defined by the 
directive. Experience with existing voluntary agreements has shown so far, that the 
fora for transnational information and consultation were not used for more than 
information and consultation, and certainly not for European wide bargaining about 
working conditions. Even within a country working conditions in different plants of a 
company or different companies of a group can vary considerably without leading to 
company or group level negotiations despite the fact, that central information and 
consultation bodies have existed (e.g. Comité de groupe in France, Gesamtbetriebsrat 
or Konzernbetriebsrat in Germany) – so there is no reason to expect that the existence 
of European works councils will lead to European-wide bargaining within the 
companies in question. 
Finally, the passage to EMU will certainly make cost structures within 
companies more transparent throughout Europe. However, this in itself will not 
necessarily lead to autonomous Europe-wide collective bargaining (Fröhlich 1994). If 
it is likely though that European industrial relations will intensify with the 
introduction EMU, this will happen as a reaction to political decisions and pressures 
by governments to complement EMU with a social dimension – a phenomenon 
already present at the introduction of the Single market project of 1987. So the most 
likely forecast for the near future is that industrial relations will intensify at European 
level, but that this intensification will be very closely linked to the social policy agenda 
of the European Union and the legal framework set at European level for the promotion 
of Europe wide industrial relations. In the short run it will probaly not involve 
„classical“ collective bargaining patterns comparable to the national level – mainly 
because there exists no Europe-wide framework for such bargaining patterns. 
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